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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Ram Sachs1

ABSTRACT
International economic agreements increasingly touch on
fundamental principles of corporate governance. The trend
contrasts with existing scholarship, which assumes corporate
law evolves via domestic mechanisms. This Article introduces
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its
dedicated chapter on corporate governance, as a case study. At
the normative level, the emergence of corporate governance in
international agreements represents a positive development by
enabling countries to signal and put into action commitments for
better governance. Given these recent developments, the field
of comparative corporate governance should incorporate
international agreements as an emerging source of law.
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INTRODUCTION
In February 2019, a new Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA) came into force between the European Union and Japan.2
The parties have touted a remarkable innovation in the text: for
the first time, an EU trade agreement includes an entire chapter
dedicated to corporate governance.3 Thus far, no academic
article has analyzed this agreement nor its relation to past
corporate governance initiatives. This gap is striking, given the
expected scale and influence of the agreement. The two
signatories cover a combined economic area equal to a third of
global GDP and over 600 million people.4
The addition of a corporate governance chapter in the EPA
is seemingly groundbreaking. However, it actually follows a
broader pattern of international economic agreements
impacting domestic corporate law and governance.
This Article seeks to expand the existing literature on
international law and corporate governance by analyzing
provisions in the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
and previous economic agreements. Through explicit and
implicit provisions, international economic agreements have a
major but unappreciated influence on intra-firm dynamics
between shareholders, managers, directors, and other
stakeholders. These agreements can encourage convergence
over a shared set of corporate governance principles.
The increased focus on corporate governance in
international agreements represents a positive development by
enabling countries to signal and put into action a commitment
to better governance. Looking ahead, the European Union, and
even the United States, may push similar corporate governance
2
European Commission Press Release IP/19/785, EU-Japan Trade
Agreement Enters Into Force (Jan. 31, 2019).
3 European Commission MEMO/18/6784, Key Elements of the EU-Japan
Economic Partnership Agreement (Dec. 12, 2018).
4 Foo Yun Chee, EU-Japan Free Trade Deal Cleared for Early 2019 Start,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2018, 7:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eujapan-trade/eu-japan-free-trade-deal-cleared-for-early-2019-startidUSKBN1OB1EN.
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initiatives in future economic agreements. Such initiatives
could strengthen domestic reformers in countries looking to
implement more accountable corporate governance regimes.
Part I will provide the current landscape for debates in
comparative corporate governance. Part II introduces the new
EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, with its dedicated
chapter on corporate governance. Part III will seek to identify
theoretical explanations for the appearance of corporate
governance provisions in international agreements. Part IV
places the EPA within the broader history of international
agreements that explicitly and implicitly impact intrafirm
governance.
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), with its
dedicated corporate governance chapter, emerges amidst
ongoing discussion about the role of corporate governance in
economic growth.
Research has demonstrated that
improvements in corporate governance, such as investor
protection, can have a positive impact on firm performance.5
Such improvements can scale across an economy. More broadly,
a debate rages on whether corporate law can promote capital
markets, which are seen as an important tool for development.6
The literature has broadly assumed that corporate governance
is a matter of firm choice under the constraint of a given
country’s laws.
The discipline of corporate governance delves into the web
of relationships, rights, and responsibilities of different actors
involved in a corporation. The Organization for Economic
5
See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and
Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 257 (2008) (finding positive
correlations between difference governance measures and firm operating
performance).
6 See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,
46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285 (2008) (describing the differing economic
consequences of the common and civil law systems); c.f., Mark J. Roe, Legal
Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 527 (2006)
(legal origins data is not a strong indicator for predicting financial outcomes of
countries in the twentieth century).
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines corporate
governance as “a set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders, and other
stakeholders.”7
Corporate governance also includes “the
structure through which the objectives of the company are set,
and the means of attaining those objectives . . . .”8 Corporate
law regulates these interactions, focusing on reducing conflicts
inherent between major actors in the corporation: managers and
shareholders, controlling and non-controlling shareholders, and
shareholders and other contractual parties (such as employees
and creditors).9 Private sources of regulation also exist. Stock
exchanges, for instance, set requirements for listed firms. “Soft
law,” involving voluntary corporate commitments, plays an
influential gap-filling role.10 A prominent example includes the
Cadbury Code in the United Kingdom, which was developed by
the Financial Reporting Council, the Stock Exchange and the
accountancy profession.11
A. The Convergence Debate
Globalization has raised the stature of corporate
governance, as companies subject to one set of national rules
trade, operate, and compete with counterparts operating under
other sets of rules. Such interactions have raised questions of
whether current economic and political trends will result in one
set of principles, or whether domestic differences and the rise of
new players, such as China, will result in divergent trajectories.

7 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, G20/OECD
Principles
of
Corporate
Governance
1,
11
(2015),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf
(hereinafter OECD Principles); see infra Section I.D (discussing further the
OECD’s approach to corporate governance).
8 OECD Principles, supra note 7.
9 John Armour et al., The Essential Elements of Corporate Law: What is
Corporate Law?, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 2, 3 (Gerard Hertig et al. eds.,
2017).
10
See Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate
Governance: The Significance of “Soft Law” and International Institutions, 34
GA. L. REV. 669, 670 (2000) (arguing that “soft law” has overtaken law itself as
the “principal determinant of corporate behavior”).
11
Mohammed B. Hemraj, Preventing Corporate Failure: The Cadbury
Committee’s Corporate Governance Report, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 141, 142 (2002).
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On the side of convergence, Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman argue in The End of History for Corporate Law that
the remaining differences in national systems are relatively
minor.12 Corporations around the world benefit, by law, from a
similar set of features, including a recognized legal personality,
limited liability, and transferable share ownership.
An
emerging consensus of jurisdictions gives shareholders control
of the corporation, obligates managers to focus on shareholder
interests, and segregates other stakeholders to the realm of
regulatory or contract enforcement.13 Such changes have
emerged from three dynamics of the global economy: “the failure
of alternative models, the competitive pressures of global
commerce, and the shift of interest group influence in favor of an
emerging shareholder class.”14 These justifications connect to
the centrality of globalization in the convergence hypothesis. In
a competitive environment, effective corporate governance can
serve as an advantage for individual companies and nations.
Better practices can result in increased investor confidence, and
in turn, a lower cost of capital. Companies and individuals are
thus incentivized towards a natural uptake of efficient norms. 15
Alternatively, investors and acquirers operating in global capital
markets seek to standardize corporate governance practices to
facilitate the flow of capital.16
Other scholars have opposed the convergence hypothesis,
highlighting the persistence of nation-specific corporate
governance practices.17 Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe have
12
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
13
Id. at 440.
14
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Reflections on the End of
History for Corporate Law, in THE CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
32 (Abdul A. Rasheed & Toru Yoshikawa eds., 2012).
15 See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, C ONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark Roe eds., 2004)
(discussing the diffusion of corporate governance norms through investors,
international organizations, and other actors).
16
Id.; see infra Section III.D (discussing standardization in corporate
governance practice, reducing the costs for investors to understand and operate
under different regimes).
17 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127
(1999) (identifying initial legal structures as an impediment to global
convergence).
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proposed a path dependence theory: the initial ownership
structures of a society, and the precedent of corporate law and
practice, insulate domestic corporate structures from global
pressures to conform.18
The emergence of international regimes for corporate
governance appear, at first glance, to support the convergence
hypothesis. Particularly where provisions require specific
binding actions, such agreements push domestic law towards
similar outcomes. However, as discussed below, international
agreements may also leave room for, or explicitly permit,
significant amounts of domestic variation.
B. Comparative Corporate Governance and International
Regimes
Analyses of comparative corporate governance have largely
neglected the role of state-to-state or multilateral agreements in
influencing corporate governance practice. The preceding
convergence debate highlights the role of decentralized
participants in the evolution of corporate governance: (i) local
actors, including the political and business sectors; and (ii)
foreign actors, typified by investors and acquirers.19 The model
focuses on a domestic view of corporate governance diffusion,
where each nation, and actors within each nation, engage in a
decentralized process of reform or resistance.
Newer scholarship has begun exploring the role of global
governance on corporate law practice. For instance, Jeffrey
Gordon has critiqued an approach that ignores international
regimes, noting that:
To an extent that might surprise academics focused on the political
economy of races to the top or bottom driven by local political
economy, convergence on a common set of corporate governance

Id. at 129.
Jeffrey Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
28, 28 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2017).
18
19
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principles and practices has been driven by various forms of global
governance.20

One thread of scholarship has embraced international
regimes for corporate governance. Jeffrey Gordon and Curtis
Milhaupt have proposed a multilateral regime to regulate
outbound M&A activity for firms under potential government
influence.21 The proposal aims to ensure that “the prospective
buyer is motivated by private economic gain-seeking,” and not
by nationalist/mercantilist goals.22 Their work emerges from the
rise of Chinese-style entities that threaten the model of a profitdriven corporate entity.23
Mariana Pargendler has raised doubt on the viability of
international corporate governance regimes by highlighting
protectionism in corporate law.24 Nationalism has shaped
corporate law into a tool to prevent competition, impeding
convergence towards a shareholder-friendly governance model. 25
Resurgent nationalist impulses may weaken the prospects for
corporate governance in international agreements.
Other works have narrowly assessed the role of specific
provisions of international economic agreements, often focusing
on the role of international arbitration provisions in intra-firm
governance.26 Arbitration agreements may violate principles of
corporate governance by privileging one group of equity holders
(foreign shareholders) with remedies unavailable to another

20
Jeffrey Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and
Governance 28, 50 (Columbia Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 574, 2017).
21
See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Curtis J. Milhaupt, China as a
‘National Strategic Buyer’: Towards a Multilateral Regime for Cross-Border
M&A 192 (Columbia Law & Econs., Working Paper No. 585, 2018).
22 Id. at 196.
23 Id. at 225.
24 Mariana Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law 1, 3
(European Corp. Governance Inst. Law, Working Paper No. 437, 2019).
25 Id. at 4.
26 See, e.g., Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: How
International Investment Law Changes Corporate Law and Governance, 40 U.
PENN. J. INT’L L. 189, 189 (2018) (highlighting the issues associated with
permitting shareholders to bring indirect reflective loss claims through
arbitration, while traditional corporate law frowns on such suits without
director approval or coordination with the corporation).
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C. Harmonization and Unification
Global corporate governance could involve harmonization,
or in the more extreme case, unification. Harmonization aligns
domestic laws to address an externality or need for collective
action (for example, to stem a race to the bottom in terms of tax
treatment). Unification takes the concept further, resulting in
parties that are bound by the same authority and the same law.
In the corporate governance space, the European Union
(EU) provides a conspicuous example of international
coordination in corporate law. Brussels has included corporate
governance as part of a broader integrationist agenda because
domestic corporate law can impinge on the free movement of
capital and support protectionist tendencies.27 In response, the
EU created the Societas Europaea, which facilitates cross-border
transfers and mergers.28 Other EU initiatives have focused on
harmonization of national laws. Directives have forced member
states to facilitate shareholder voting and activism,29 and force
disclosure of large voting blocks.30 However, the EU has also
failed quite significantly in imposing uniform rules, most
obviously in the optional implementation of 2004 Takeover
Directive.31
This Article will instead focus on relatively
understudied international efforts beyond internal EU policies.
For instance, the OECD has provided a particularly useful set of

27 Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence
and Varieties of Capitalism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF
CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 323–25, (Harwell Wells ed. 2018); see also Luca
Enriques, A Harmonized European Company Law: Are We There Already?, 66
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 323, 333–34 (2017) (discussing company law harmonization
within the European Union).
28 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001, of 8 Oct. 2001, art. 24.
29
Caspar Rose, The New European Shareholder Rights Directive:
Removing Barriers and Creating Opportunities for More Shareholder Activism
and Democracy, 16 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 269, 269 (2012).
30 Marco Becht & Ailsa Röell, Blockholdings in Europe: An International
Comparison, 43 EURO. ECON. REV. 1049, 1050 (1999).
31 Ben Clift, The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the
Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and
French) Corporate Governance, 47 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 55, 55 (2009).
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guidelines that have set the agenda for corporate governance
reforms in both developed and emerging markets.32
D. Global Standards: The Role of the G20/OECD Principles on
Corporate Governance
Since the late 1990’s, the non-binding OECD Principles
have emerged as a prominent building block for the diffusion of
corporate governance practices.
Today, many of the
international agreements on corporate governance explicitly
adhere to these Principles. Such alignment between
international agreements and the OECD Principles has the
potential to speed up convergence in rules and practices.33
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and
other international organizations participated in the formation
of the OECD Principles and use the output to assess individual
country performance.34 Using one comprehensive document
enables these international organizations and other observers to
evaluate disparate corporate governance regimes on a similar
basis.
Among OECD members, Japan’s recent corporate
OECD Principles, supra note 7.
Id. at 5 (The OECD Principles focus on six components: (i) “ensuring
the basis for an effective corporate governance framework,” focused on
transparency and fairness, the rule of law, and supervision and enforcement;
(ii) “the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders and key ownership
functions,” setting out the requirements for effective shareholder participation,
protection of minority shareholders, related-party transactions, and fair
processes for transfer of control; (iii) “institutional investors, stock markets,
and other intermediaries,” to align incentives for capital markets to support
sound economic growth; (iv) “the role of stakeholders in corporate governance,”
establishing that stakeholder rights based on law, contract, or other
agreements must be respected; (v) “disclosure and transparency,” focused on
“all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company;” and (vi)
“the responsibility of the board,” establishing the board’s obligation to monitor
management and the board’s own accountability to the company and its
shareholders).
34
E.g., Corporate Governance, WORLD BANK, (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/corporate-governance
(discussing the work of the World Bank’s Corporate Governance group, which
engages with the OECD to set standards); Reports on the Observance of
Standards
and
Codes,
INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY
FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/NP/rosc/rosc.aspx (last updated: June 21, 2019)
(using the OECD guidelines to evaluate country performance on corporate
governance).
32
33
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governance discussions are typical—policymakers have
explicitly cited the Principles in formulating and messaging
changes.35 Non-OECD members also look to the Principles—
recently, Colombia drafted corporate law reforms as part of its
OECD accession efforts.36 Even when formal legal changes do
not immediately take place, the Principles operate as “soft law”
by influencing corporate practices.37 The OECD Principles have
emerged as the fundamentally voluntary starting position for
many global efforts to reform corporate governance.
II. CASE STUDY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHAPTER IN THE
EU-JAPAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
The 2018 EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement
(EPA) includes a unique provision—an entire chapter dedicated
to corporate governance.38 The EPA aims to facilitate trade and
investment between EU member states and Japan, where
existing economic ties had stagnated or even declined. The
agreement primarily tackles tariffs and regulatory frameworks.
By including corporate governance among these topics, the EPA
responded to a convergence of private and public sector concerns
35 Masato Kanda, Corporate Governance for Growth: Japan’s Initiative
Along
with
OECD
(Oct.
29
2015),
https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/conference/danwa/20151029.pdf (“It is a great
honor for me to have this opportunity to introduce Japan’s recent initiatives of
corporate governance reforms which are in line with the new OECD Principals
and the mutual relationship between them.”).
36
OECD,
Corporate
Governance
in
Colombia
(2017),
http://www.ciando.com/img/books/extract/9264281134_lp.pdf
(discussing
reforms Colombia made in preparation of OECD accession).
37 Ruth V. Aguilera & Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Codes of Good Governance
Worldwide: What is the Trigger?, 25 ORG. STUD. 415, 417 (2004) (discussing the
use of voluntary corporate governance principles to overcome legal obstacles
and change business practices); LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 113, 113 (1998) (discussing the significant critiques of the Principles
have focused on insufficient attention to the relative strength of controlling
and minority shareholders. Pre-2015 versions of the Principles focused on
resolving conflicts between management and shareholders and did not address
abusive actions by controlling shareholders. Today, the Principles suggest low
share ownership thresholds for proposing agenda items, supermajority
requirements for important decisions, redress against abusive actions, and
directors independent of dominant shareholders); see also Victor Zitian Chen
et al., Are OECD-prescribed “Good Corporate Governance Practices” Really
Good in an Emerging Economy?, 28 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 115, 115 (2011)
(assessing the application of an earlier version of the G20/OECD Principles).
38 European Commission MEMO/18/6784, supra note 3.
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about Japan’s corporate governance practices.39
The inclusion of a new subject matter within a trade
agreement raises questions about the motivations of the parties,
and the rationale for its inclusion in a broader trade and
investment agreement. This agreement provides Japan with a
strong signaling device to highlight recent efforts to improve
corporate governance.
The agreement’s flexible language
correctly avoids the risks of overly-constraining language, as the
agreement must be reconciled with the varieties of capitalism
present in EU member states and Japan.
A. The Stated Rationale: Corporate Governance for Economic
Integration
Publications from the European Union frame the
investment and anti-protectionist justifications for a chapter for
corporate governance. A European Commission report focused
on the expected investment benefits: “the corporate governance
chapter has the potential to impact FDI not only in quantitative
terms, by increasing the attractiveness of the investment
environment in both Parties, but also in qualitative terms, by
encouraging responsible and sustainable investment.”40 The
improvement in the investment environment impacts both
cross-border financial flows (which are largely within scope of
the EPA), but also domestic investment (by encouraging more
“responsible and sustainable” practices). The report focuses on
corporate governance “as an essential tool to attract and
encourage investment by promoting well-functioning markets
and sound financial systems based on transparency, efficiency,
trust and integrity.”41
A second report by the European Parliament embraced a
more comprehensive rationale focused on both investment
protection and avoiding protectionism. The study explained
that:
Id.
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, The Economic
Impact of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), at 33, (June
2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/157116.htm.
41 Id.
39
40
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These new [corporate governance] commitments were made with
the aim to: i) set high standards in corporate governance; ii) reduce
behind-the-border barriers on investment arising from diverging
regulations on the management of firms; and iii) increase investor
confidence, investment and competitiveness.42

The parliamentary study acknowledges the importance of
investment, while also introducing two other goals. First, it
asserts a normative judgement: the EPA establishes “high
standards,” implying that practices diverging from these
principles would be, in effect, substandard and fail to promote
investment and sustainable economic growth.43 Second, it
reframes corporate governance as a “behind-the-border barrier”
to trade—more similar to an effort that reduces the protectionist
impact of countries’ differing regulatory regimes.44
The
parliamentary study reframes corporate governance as another
building block to encourage economic integration—on par with
other technical regulatory alignments frequently included
within trade and investment agreements.45

42
Policy Department for External Relations, Directorate General for
External Policies of the Union, Study of The EU-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement,
at
20
(Sept.
2018),
http://bruegel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/EXPO_STU2018603880_EN.pdf
.
43 Id.
44
Marta Wajda-Lichy, Traditional Protectionism Versus Behind-theBorder Barriers in the Post-Crisis Era: Experience of Three Groups of
Countries: The EU, NAFTA and BRICS, 7 J. INT’L STUD. 141, 148 (2014) (listing
examples such as: “technical barriers to trade, subsidies to exporters,
administrative regulations concerning public procurement, sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations”).
45 See Reeve T. Bull et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory
Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade
Agreements, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2015) (discussing regulatory
alignment efforts).
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B. The Japanese Context: Corporate Governance Reforms for
Economic Growth
Japan engaged in extensive corporate governance reforms
concurrently with the negotiation of the EPA. “Abenomics,”
named after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, seeks to
address long-standing barriers to economic growth through
three “arrows”: monetary policy, financial stimulus, and
structural reform.46 Corporate governance is a major element of
structural reform, along with improved female workforce
participation, education reform, and other industry-specific
efficiency improvements.47
This section focuses on Japan’s efforts given the extensive
push among policymakers and private sector leaders in Tokyo to
reform corporate governance. The European Union certainly
maintains an active corporate governance harmonization
agenda. However, the corporate governance chapter can be
more easily seen as a response to Japan’s excessively promanager corporate governance regime and traditional hostility
to foreign control.
Long-standing concerns with Japanese corporate
governance have emerged in previous economic agreements. In
1990, Japan and the United States negotiated the Structural
Impediments Initiative (SII) to address trade imbalances, with
a focus on non-tariff contributors, including corporate
governance.48 One initiative included increased enforcement
against the kereitsu system,49 where extensive cross-holding of
shares between different companies creating interlocking
corporate relationships across the economy.50 The EPA’s
James McBride & Beina Xu, Abenomics and the Japanese Economy,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(Mar.
23,
2018),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/abenomics-and-japanese-economy#chaptertitle-0-4.
47 Rob Harding, The Third Arrow of Abenomics: A Scorecard, FIN. TIMES
(Sept.
8,
2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/ee40a73c-521d-11e5-8642453585f2cfcd.
48
Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An
Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 436, 436 (1990).
49
See id. at 443 (discussing the kereitsu system).
50
Taizo Wada, Asset Managers Raise Pressure on Japan’s Board
Appointments,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
REV.
(June
14,
2018),
46
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corporate governance chapter can be seen as an extension of this
decades-old concern about Tokyo’s trade and investment
barriers.
More recently, Milhaupt summarized the main challenges
relevant to Japan’s corporate sector:
(1) low profitability/low productivity of capital, reflected in the low
return on equity (ROE) of Japanese firms in comparison to their
global counterparts . . . (2) loss of international competitiveness,
particularly in markets where Japanese firms were once global
leaders . . . (3) weak internal compliance systems and lax board
oversight, manifest in a series of widely publicized scandals. 51

Japanese corporate governance has tended to insulate
management and exacerbate existing challenges. In addition to
the cross-holding of shares, former executives often fill seats on
boards, undercutting oversight efforts unfavorable to current
company management.52
Among shareholders, there is
relatively little meaningful participation: hundreds of
shareholder meetings are held on the same day of the year and
a negative perception exists around activism.53
The Abe government has engaged in multiple corporate
governance reforms seeking to change laws, corporate behavior,
and shareholder norms. The 2015 Companies Act revision
added a third board option to increase board effectiveness.54 The
new framework eliminated the separate kansayaku board of
auditors, and instead requires an audit committee composed of
members of the board of directors.55 Reformers hoped this
measure would encourage the addition of independent directors
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Asset-managers-raisepressure-on-Japan-s-board-appointments.
51 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Evaluating Abe’s Third Arrow: How Significant are
Japan’s Recent Corporate Governance Reforms? 1, 3 (Columbia Law & Econs.,
Working Paper No. 561, 2017).
52 Eric Pfanner, Corporate Japan Looks for Outside Advice, WALL ST. J.
(June 8, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-japan-looks-foroutside-advice-1433789544.
53 Hiroko Tabuchi, In Japan, Hundreds of Shareholder Meetings on Same
Day, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/injapan-hundreds-of-shareholder-meetings-on-same-day/.
54 Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 1.
55 Id. at 4.
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and address the perceived ineffectiveness of the boards of
auditors, who do not have a vote on the board of directors.56 To
improve shareholder oversight, a new Stewardship Code
developed for institutional investors seeks to increase
engagement and voting disclosure.57 Other updates in the
Corporate Governance code push for independent directors,
reduced cross-shareholdings (by requiring companies to explain
the rationale and objective of cross-holdings), and improved
disclosure.58
C. Assessing the Text: Aspirational Language, and Highly
Flexible Implementation
The language of the EPA’s individual provisions highlights
cornerstone concepts of corporate governance. In its approach,
the governance chapter provides guiding principles but refrains
from requiring specific actions. As a result, the text highlights
Japan’s willingness to promote broadly-accepted corporate
governance goals, but avoids the pitfalls of an overly-constricting
agreement.
The following section analyzes the different articles of the
chapter: (1) Objectives, (2) General principles, (3) Rights of
shareholders and ownership functions, (4) Roles of the board,
and (5) Takeovers.
1.

Article I: Objectives

The Corporate Governance chapter opens by stating the
rationale for including corporate governance in the EPA. The
rhetoric aligns with the broader push by stakeholders and
academics to consider corporate governance as a tool of economic
development.
For one, the parties link the chapter to economic growth.
The parties recognize “the importance of an effective corporate
governance framework to achieve economic growth through
well-functioning markets and sound financial systems based on
56
57
58

Id. at 10.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
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transparency, efficiency, trust and integrity.”59 Next, the parties
focus on investment protection as a means of fully following
through on the agreement’s opportunities: “[e]ach party . . .
recognize[s] that those [corporate governance] measures will
attract and encourage investment by enhancing investor
confidence and improving competitiveness, thus enabling best
advantage to be taken of the opportunities granted by its
respective market access commitments.”60
The parties place the corporate governance commitments
within the broader goals of facilitating market access: “[t]he
Parties commit to respect the principles and adhere to the
provisions of this Chapter to the extent that they facilitate
access to each other’s markets . . . .”61 This text clarifies that the
commitments respect each party’s autonomy in corporate
governance (“[w]ithout limiting the ability of each Party to
develop its own legal, institutional and regulatory framework in
relation to the corporate governance of publicly listed
companies . . .”).62 In a recurrent theme, the agreement specifies
a certain standard, but nonetheless provides an open door for
the parties to maintain, tailor, and experiment.
2.

Article III: General Principles

The General Principles article addresses the typical agency
issues of corporate governance.63
First, the text encourages accountability in a myriad of
relationships: between “management and the board towards
shareholders,” between the management and the board, relying
on “board decision-making based on an independent and
objective standpoint,” and between shareholders, based on
“equal treatment of shareholders of the same class.”64 In
59 Agreement between the European Union and Japan for Economic
Partnership,
Dec.
8,
2017,
art.
15.1(1),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157228.pdf#page=43
3 [hereinafter EU-Japan EPA].
60 Id. art. 15.1(2).
61 Id. art. 15.1(3).
62 Id.
63 Id. art. 15.3.
64 Id. art. 15.3(1).
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particular, the language around “independent” and “objectives”
boards addresses the Japanese problem of excessive board
deference to management.65
The agreement also recognizes the importance of public
disclosure, “including the financial situation, performance,
ownership and governance of those companies.” 66 Such policies
are the cornerstone for robust capital markets.
For implementation, the General Principles endorse
comply-or-explain provisions, which align to both Japanese and
European models.
Comply or explain provisions require
companies to either implement a code’s requirements, or instead
disclose a rationale for not doing so.67 Milhaupt finds comply-orexplain regimes to be a particularly weak solution for the
Japanese context, where companies who would benefit most
from new corporate governance provisions choose to explain and
not comply.68 Comply-or-explain approaches assume market
pressures will force firms into efficient governance choices. 69
This approach reflects the existing policies of Japan and the
European Union.70
The parties also provide for exemptions to the agreement’s
requirements, based on objective and nondiscriminatory
criteria.71 The text provides examples—exclusions may apply
based on a company’s size or early phase of development.72
These exceptions appear to be reasonable.
Corporate
governance requirements, particularly around disclosure, have
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.3(2).
Id. art. 15.3(1).
67 See Maria Elisabeth Sturm, Corporate Governance in the EU and U.S.:
Comply-or-Explain Versus Rule 1, 1–15 (Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech.
Law Forum, Working Paper No. 16, 2016).
68 See Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 8 (critiquing the utility of comply-orexplain for corporate governance reform in the Japanese context); see also
George Hadjikyprianou, The Principle of ‘Comply or Explain’ Underpinning the
UK Corporate Governance Regulations: Is There a Need for Change?, 7 CORP.
GOVERNANCE L.J. 1, 3 (2015) (arguing against using “hard law” to address
deficiencies in the U.K. comply-or-explain regime).
69 Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 15.
70 Id. at 6.
71 EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 4.4(1).
72 Id. art. 4.6.
65

66
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historically generated complaints about the high cost and
smaller benefit for certain classes of companies. Again, the
agreement allows for deviation and experimentation.
3. Article IV: Rights of Shareholders and Ownership
Functions
Next, the agreement focuses on the rights of shareholders
and ownership functions—principally, effective shareholder
democracy and information disclosure.73 These sections focus on
the goal of meaningful shareholder engagement and oversight,
while avoiding specific rules.
Addressing shareholder democracy, the agreement requires
parties to allow “participation and voting in the general
meeting” and “election and removal of members of the board.” 74
The agreement includes provisions “facilitating the effective
exercise of shareholders’ rights . . . allowing shareholders to
oversee board behaviour and participate in important decisionmaking . . . .”75 Problematically, meetings of many Japanese
companies are set for the same day of the year, limiting
meaningful shareholder participation and voting in the general
meetings.76 Furthermore, members of the board are often drawn
from the ranks of managers of the firm—rather than serving as
shareholder representatives.77 The EPA highlights the need for
new practices.
Meaningful decision-making also requires timely
information disclosure.78 The disclosure provisions noted here
complement the procedural push for shareholder democracy. As
examples, the provision suggests disclosure of “the capital
structure, with an indication of the different classes of shares
where appropriate, direct and indirect shareholdings which are
considered to be significant, and special control rights.”79 This
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. ch. 15.
Id. art. 15.4(1).
Id.
Milhaupt, supra note 51, at 10.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 5.
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.4(2).
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disclosure framework may help domestic investors argue for
additional disclosure. But, a disclosure regime may actually be
more powerful for foreign investors—who are the primary
targets of an investment agreement. Foreign investors often
face significant risk investing in a country with very different
corporate governance laws and practices.80 For example, joint
ventures in Brazil with foreign investors have a high failure rate
in part because investors do not realize how to protect against
partners with pyramidal controls.81 Similarly, the European
and Japanese corporate governance models diverge
significantly, raising issues of investor awareness and
understanding of differing practices.82 Disclosure requirements
focusing on control rights may help educate foreign investors
and managers.
4.

Article V: Roles of the Board

The agreement defines the types of board accountability and
the means of achieving this accountability. The agreement
highlights three goals of board-related accountability: (1) the
board’s effective monitoring of management; (2) board
accountability to shareholders; and (3) disclosure of information
about the board to shareholders.83
Independent directors emerge as a tool for achieving this
level of accountability. The agreement promotes the “effective
use of a sufficient number of independent directors” as a means
of ensuring effective monitoring.84 The provision acknowledges
a diversity of interpretations: “[e]ach Party may determine in its
jurisdiction what constitutes a ‘sufficient number of independent
directors’ in either qualitative or quantitative terms.”85 Such
flexible terms match the needs of Japan and EU member states,
given the diversity of corporate ownership patterns. The
80 Susan Perkins et al., Innocents Abroad: The Hazards of International
Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms, 4 GLOBAL STRATEGY J. 310, 311
(2014).
81
See id. at 311 (introducing data and drivers for the failure of joint
ventures in Brazil).
82 Id. at 312.
83 EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.5.
84 Id. art. 15.5(a).
85 EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, n. 126.
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definition of independence should be determined based on the
agency problem to be solved—for instance, in some countries,
independence must be from dominant family owners or
blockholders, while in countries dominated by diffuse
shareholding, directors should be independent from corporate
insiders.86
Within Japan, a newly-emergent legal movement favoring
independent directors aligns with the commitments made in the
EPA. The 2015 Corporate Governance Code requires companies,
on a comply-or-explain basis, to appoint two or more
independent directors.87 The agreement does not appear to
require further action—but it does reiterate an underlying
commitment to independent directors. These provisions also
align with OECD guidance, which promotes independent
directors but recognizes the range of practices.88
5.

Article VI: Takeovers

The takeover provisions involve short and weak language.
Article 15.6 requires that “[e]ach Party shall provide rules and
procedures governing takeovers in publicly listed companies.
Such rules and procedures shall aim to enable those transactions
to occur at transparent prices and under fair conditions.”89 This
outcome reflects the lack of consensus within Europe or Japan
on appropriate takeover laws. Europe has historically had
difficulty aligning takeover practices, resulting in watered-down
86
Gordon & Roe, supra note 15, at 36; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Corporate Governance Standards, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1263, 1302 (2009); Dan W. Puchniak & Umakanth Varottil, Related
Party Transactions in Commonwealth Asia: Complexity Revealed 1–27
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 404, 2018) (discussing
the challenges of regulating related party transactions in Asian firms of
varying ownership types).
87
Jones et al., Japanese Corporate Governance is Changing with the
Adoption of a New Code in 2015, JONES DAY (Feb. 2015),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2015/02/japanese-corporategovernance-is-changing-with-the-adoption-of-a-new-code-in-2015.
88
OECD,
OECD Corporate Governance Factbook (2019),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporate-governance-factbook.htm
(“National
approaches on the definition of independence for independent directors vary
considerably, particularly with regard to maximum tenure and independence
from a significant shareholder.”).
89 EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.6.
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and non-binding EU policies.90 Japan, for its part, has had a
long-standing anti-takeover orientation from the extensive
cross-holding of shares91 and government approval of facially
neutral takeover defenses.92 As a result, neither party has an
interest in using the EPA to facilitate takeover activity.
The provisions of the EPA tackle the details of corporate
governance in an unprecedented manner. Beyond individual
provisions, broader theoretical questions emerge as to why
corporate governance regulation has emerged in international
economic agreements. The following section proposes several
explanations and applies those theories to the case of the EUJapan EPA.
III. THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
AGREEMENTS
Corporate governance provisions, interwoven within trade
and investment agreements, represent an emerging avenue of
legal diffusion. This section addresses the theoretical rationale
for corporate governance in international economic agreements.
A. A Credible Commitment Mechanism
Parties signing international agreements may use these
documents as credible commitment mechanisms.
A
straightforward reading of corporate governance provisions
focuses on the substantive impact: international agreements
provide specific rights, particularly for foreign investors or
minority shareholders. In some instances, compliance with an
agreement requires domestic legal reforms that result in a more
pro-investor orientation.
Reneging on these provisions
constitutes a costly breach of international commitments.93
90 See Mark Humphrey-Jenner, The Impact of the EU Takeover Directive
on Takeover Performance and Empire Building, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 254, 260–272
(2012) (providing a history and critique of the EU Takeover Directive).
91 Joseph Lee, The Current Barriers to Corporate Takeovers in Japan: Do
the UK Takeover Code and the EU Takeover Directive Offer a Solution?, 18
EURO. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 761, 766 (2017).
92 Pargendler, supra note 24, at 23.
93
See Robert O. Keohane, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE
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International relations theory recognizes treaties as
signaling devices. Neumayer and Spess identify that “[Bilateral
investment treaties (BITs)] are likely to fulfil the dual function
of both signaling and commitment.”94 Büthe and Milner have
identified the commitment mechanism as a key driver for the
increase in foreign direct investment after the signing of an
international trade agreement.95 Kerner postulates that the
more BITs a country signs, the more credible its commitment is
to treat foreign investors as good, or better, than its domestic
counterparties.96 A less developed country may use the treaty
as evidence of a newfound willingness to protect foreign
investors’ property rights. Researchers have postulated that the
commitment signal increases investment for two subgroups of
foreign investors: (1) foreign investors from the party nations,
and (2) foreign investors from other, non-party nations.97
Foreign investors from party nations would invest due to the
substantive protections and signaling effect. Meanwhile, nonparty foreign investors may increase investment due to the
signaling inherent in signing these agreements.
The signaling effect from corporate governance provisions
are unlikely to apply uniformly. Instead, there is likely a
credibility requirement. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman argue that
the signaling benefit of a BIT “is dependent on the broader
institutional environment in the host country.”98 Pistor argues
POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 5 (1989) (discussing
international regimes); see Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State
Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 821 (2000) (discussing markets and international
monetary law, specifically expectations regarding commitment and
compliance).
94
Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 3 WORLD DEV.
1567, 1572 (2005) (identifying spill-over effects from signing a BIT that
protects foreign investment).
95 Tim Büthe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment
into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through International Trade
Agreements?, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 741, 744 (2008).
96
Andrew Kerner, Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and
Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 73, 74 (2009).
97
Neumayer & Spess, supra note 94, at 1571.
98 Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs have Some Bite:
The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV.
INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (2011).
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that “reforms depend on the existence of a fairly developed and
well-functioning
legal
infrastructure.
Absent
this
infrastructure, [standardization] reforms in the areas of
accounting standards, securities legislation, insurance
regulation, and even corporate governance will remain at the
surface.”99
B. Overcoming Domestic Opposition to Reform
International agreements can wrestle control of the policy
agenda away from domestic opposition to reform. In their
absence, nationalist instincts within corporate law may result in
suboptimal governance regimes.100 For instance, economic
agreements can wrest corporate governance away from certain
business and political elites who benefit from protectionist
policies.
International organizations and scholars have recognized
the potential impact of corporate governance commitments. A
World Bank analysis of Vietnam asserts that “[State-owned
enterprises (SOEs)] corporate governance reforms would
respond to TPP implementation needs and principles.”101 In
discussions over a proposed China-EU BIT, advocates
highlighted that an agreement would enable interest groups
within the Chinese bureaucracy to push for better SOE
governance.102
Scholars have different assessments of the depth of
potential opposition that international agreements must
overcome.
Sykes, in discussing the broader category of
99
Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and its Effect on
Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 100 (2002).
100 Pargendler, supra note 24, at 3.
101 World Bank and Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade, Seizing the
Opportunities of New-Generation Free Trade Agreements, WORLD BANK 2, 124
(Sep.
2016),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/101021521557242199/pdf/124458WP-PUBLIC-VietNamSeizingopportunitiesfromnewgenerationFTAsEng.pdf.
102 See Alicia García-Herrero & Jianwei Xu, How to Handle State-owned
Enterprises in EU-China Investment Talks, BRUEGEL 1, 6 (June 2017),
http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/PC-18-2017_2.pdf (discussing
the multiple binding and non-binding mechanisms for encouraging alignment
in corporate governance standards in the EU and China).
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investment protectionism, asserts that such protections benefit
from less popular support than trade protectionism.103 He
explains that “barriers to inbound investment will protect
domestic capital but may create no benefit or even cause harm
to domestic labor because foreign investors often employ
significant amounts of domestic labor in their operations.”104
Thus, labor’s benefits from the free flow of capital would reduce
popular support for investment barriers.
On the other hand, this reading underplays the possibility
of a broader anti-foreign alliance: labor and other interest
groups may also embrace investment protectionism. Foreign
business owners may be less tied to the local community and
more freely push for cost-cutting measures.105 Foreign-owned
firms may embrace international supply chains at the expense
of local producers. More broadly, foreign owners may be less
cognizant of negative externalities, and foreign management
and shareholders are less likely to experience those impacts.106
Corporate governance thus falls into the same theme as other
areas tackled by the agreements—another subject matter where
an international commitment is needed to overcome opposition
by an alliance of domestic interest groups.107
C. Changing Domestic Norms
Corporate governance provisions also serve a more
intermediary function of changing domestic norms. While the
previous explanation assumed that provisions actually have a
direct substantive impact on domestic corporate law, the
provisions might be written to have little binding impact. 108 In
such cases, provisions may instead function to change the
domestic conversation on corporate governance standards.

103 Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of International Investment
Agreements with Implications for Treaty Interpretation and Design, 113 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 482, 489 (2019).
104 Id.
105 Pargendler, supra note 24, at 39 (discussing the potential divergence
between foreign owners and local managers).
106 Id. at 7.
107 Id. at 3.
108 See infra Section III.B.
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The clearest analogy emerges from the experience of
shareholder activist battles. Kahan and Rock have identified
controversies over seemingly meaningless provisions as
examples of low-impact, but high-volume, conflicts between
domestic activist investors, managers of firms, and other
stakeholder groups.109 They have advanced that “activism has a
significant ‘symbolic’ element and cannot be fully explained by
the material stakes at issue in a given controversy.”110 These
fights aim to project power and change behavioral norms (rather
than necessarily achieve high-impact results).
The codification of corporate governance commitments in
international agreements may serve to educate domestic actors
on proper standards. Looking at changing U.S. norms, Kahan
and Rock see that, “[i]n the shift in U.S. boardrooms from a
managerial conception of the board to a more ‘shareholdercentric’ view, these [activist] battles almost certainly were
important in reorienting directors’ understanding of their
roles.”111 Provisions in international provisions may have a
similar role as activist battles: as tools to reshape a country’s
corporate governance norms, even without substantive legal
changes.
D. Reducing Differential Costs in Compliance and Transactions
Individual nations’ varying disclosure requirements result
in companies facing different compliance costs based on their
legal domicile. Standardizing requirements for disclosure can
(1) eliminate the cost advantage of competitors subject to a less
onerous disclosure regime; and (2) reduce the cost of investing in
different jurisdictions.
In jurisdictions with less onerous
disclosure requirements, compliance costs less—leading to lower
recurring legal and financial control costs. Companies in higherregulated jurisdictions may face a competitive disadvantage on
the basis of regulatory differences, rather than operational or

109 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance
Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (2014) (discussing ongoing corporate
debates such as poison pill proposals, proxy access, majority voting, and
supermajority requirements).
110 Id. at 1998–99.
111 Id. at 2024.
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strategic performance.112 Another impact of compliance costs
emerges through investors themselves. Investors operating in
different jurisdictions must spend considerable sums navigating
the thicket of unique rules governing business entities in each
jurisdiction. International agreements can establish greater
coherence among different legal regimes. At a minimum,
agreements could supply a common terminology or framework.
More comprehensive agreements can force parties to adapt
similar specifications that reduce the expenses of learning,
navigating, and complying with the rules.113
E. Cross-Border Gains and Losses from Domestic Corporate
Governance
The push to harmonize global corporate governance
standards may emerge, in part, from the realization that the bad
corporate governance can result in cross-border harm. The East
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s demonstrated the
systemic risk to entire regions from weak governance.114 As the
downturn began, managers and controlling shareholders began
expropriating value. Managers began moving money offshore
while other firms transferred funds to related companies (to the
detriment of minority shareholders).115 These actions had broad
regional implications by exacerbating the existing trend of
capital outflows, the fall of exchange rates, and cratering
investor confidence.116

112
See generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities
Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV.
1335 (1999) (further discussing the benefits of standardized disclosure).
113 See Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What
Role for the EC? 9–10 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
53, 2005) (discussing how the transactional benefits of corporate law
harmonization have been discussed in the context of the European Union, and
recognizing that in theory, harmonization may reduce transaction costs, but in
practice, European Commission actions have created overly rigid rules that
actually raise transaction costs and fail to address market failures).
114
IMF, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial
Stability in Emerging Markets, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
FOSTERING STABILITY IN A LOW GROWTH, LOW-RATE ERA, 82 (Oct. 2016)
(discussing how weak corporate governance contributes to global instability).
115 Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial
Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECONS. 141, 142–43 (2000).
116 Id. at 142.
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Conversely, the benefits of good corporate governance may
also flow across national borders. Academics have promoted
good corporate governance as a tool for spurring economic
growth in developing countries—leading to increased
opportunities for trade and investment.117
F. Addressing the Pitfalls of Homogenizing Agreements
Homogeneity reduces the diversity of corporate governance
regimes. Ideally, parties would standardize on an optimal
regime, but parties may also end up in a sub-optimal state. In
particular, too-rigid requirements may be appropriate for one
party, and not another, with homogenization placing barriers to
the natural evolution of law.
Pistor argues that “[t]he
standardization of ‘best practice’ or ‘efficient’ law replaces the
Schumpeterian process of ‘creative destruction’ with the ideal of
the ‘perfect construction’ of law.”118 The pitfalls of such
displacement are the side effects of the commitment mechanism:
standardization requires countries to adhere potentially
suboptimal legal regimes, with high costs of reneging or
changing the agreements.119
Homogeneity exposes the global economic system to the
same pitfalls, as standardized widespread rules leave all
countries with immunity to one set of problems and
vulnerability to another set of problems. Romano has posited
that the Basel architecture for financial regulation increases
systemic financial risk.120 In her reading, “[b]y incentivizing
financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar
business strategies, regulatory error contributed to a global
financial crisis.”121 Similarly, encouraging converging corporate
governance standards may also result in an analogous
117 See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52
J. FIN. 1131, 1132 (1997) (identifying the pathways explaining how good
corporate governance leads to capital growth).
118 Pistor, supra note 99, at 98.
119 Id. at 104 (“[I]n most cases, harmonization will lock a large number of
jurisdictions into suboptimal rules and prevent flexible adaptation to better
rules and changing circumstances.”).
120
Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of
Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31
YALE J. REG. 1, 6 (2014).
121 Id. at 1.
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regulatory error.
However, corporate governance provisions often specify
principles, rather than mandatory rules. The flexible nature of
corporate governance agreements thus departs from the
rigidness, and pitfalls, of other accords, such as the Basel
architecture.
G. Comparing the EU-Japan EPA to Theoretical Explanations
The EPA’s corporate governance provisions align with a
subset of the theoretical explanations explaining corporate
governance regulation in international agreements.
First, the EPA’s corporate governance chapter can serve as
a commitment mechanism.122 Japan has now provided a treatylevel commitment to corporate governance principles.123 The
country has a strong rule-of-law environment, giving credence to
the government’s ability to implement commitments.
Problematically, despite these commitments, the parties
excluded the corporate governance chapter from the EPA’s
dispute resolution mechanism.124 As a result, neither party will
have an effective way to challenge the implementation of the
chapter, other than via diplomatic pressure.
Again, the
agreement appears to highlight the parties’ renewed focus on
corporate governance while avoiding truly binding impacts.
The agreement may also support changing domestic norms.
While Japan has implemented legal reforms and a new Code of
Conduct, these changes are only meaningful with actual take-up
among the corporate community. An international agreement
can provide another jolt out of an excessively insider-captured
mindset and encourage more shareholder oversight.
By contrast, the explanation of overcoming domestic
opposition is relatively weaker in this case. Japan already
engaged in reforms prior to this agreement, so the country
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, Ch. 15.
Id.
124
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.7 (discussing the process of
mediation and arbitration panels for disputes).
122
123
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already appears largely in compliance with the agreement’s
language.125 Nor is there any evidence that the agreement
pushed forward this tide of domestic reform.126 Looking ahead,
the provisions are unlikely to serve a major role in forcing action
from reluctant domestic parties.127
Finally, the agreement appears to make minimal efforts at
reducing the differential costs of compliance and transactions.
Investors may benefit slightly from Article IV’s disclosure
provisions, which bring transparency to control rights among
shareholders.128 Such information can ease the challenges of due
diligence and structuring investment. However, this agreement
does not delve into sufficient details to meaningful address
differential costs.129
The EPA provides a new opening for the study of
comparative
corporate
governance,
highlighting
how
international agreements may take on a more significant role in
shaping domestic corporate law. The agreement provides the
appropriate gestures towards convergence, with the parties
defining and embracing shared vocabulary and text around the
goals of corporate governance.130 The chapter ultimately
emerges as a signaling exercise, maintaining significant leeway
for each party to interpret and implement its provisions.131
IV. PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IMPACTING
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
Even before the EU-Japan Economic Partnership
Agreement, international agreements have impacted corporate
governance. This subject has remained largely ignored in
existing legal scholarship, which focuses extensively on domestic
corporate law. In state-to-state agreements, explicit provisions
and secondary impacts have redrawn the rights of shareholders,
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
See infra Sections III.B, III.C.
Id. art. 14.
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, Annex 23.
Id. art. 7.12.
Id. Ch. 7.
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directors, management, and other stakeholders. The following
section covers three topics: (1) accountability and composition of
management and boards; (2) state-owned enterprises; and (3)
the equality of shareholders.
A. Accountability and Composition of Management and Boards
International agreements include provisions permitting or
restricting nationality restrictions on members of the board and
corporate management. The provisions touch on a core question
in corporate governance: the composition of a company’s
leadership.132 Such limitations undercut the power of investors
to freely nominate board members, who in turn, may not freely
hire corporate officers.
Such provisions can encourage
convergence towards greater investor control of boards and
management.133
1.

Nationality Restrictions on Management

The recent Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) language
typifies frequent language pertaining to discrimination based on
nationality.
For management roles, the TPP completely
disallows such discrimination: “[n]o Party shall require that an
enterprise of that Party that is a covered investment appoint to
a senior management position a natural person of any particular
nationality.”134
Investors may gain confidence to invest as antidiscrimination provisions can boost enterprise performance and
mitigate the agency costs of using a purely local management
team. As a starting matter, anti-discrimination provisions
enable investors to tap into a global labor pool. Foreign
managers can arrive with a proven track records and expertise
unavailable in the local market. These experienced managers
can use their expertise to strengthen a company’s
performance.135 Second, anti-discrimination provisions may also
EU-Japan EPA, supra note 59, art. 15.3(2).
Id. art. 15.4(2).
134
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Ch. 9, art. 11(1), Off. of
Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-TextInvestment.pdf [hereinafter TPP].
135 See, e.g., Ksenia Yudaeva et al., Does Foreign Ownership Matter? The
132
133
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reduce agency issues between shareholders and management. 136
While domestic managers may bring important local knowledge,
these same links may actually disadvantage performance.
Managers are likely linked to other market players through
social connections and as repeat players. As a result, domestic
managers may accrue significant non-pecuniary benefits that
extend beyond the scope of employment, such as social capital
and future employment opportunities. These benefits may
prevent managers from taking a course of action beneficial to
shareholders but detrimental to managers’ local standing. In a
more extreme example, domestic managers may decline to
implement cost-cutting initiatives to avoid angering local
suppliers, employees, and other stakeholders. Thus, local
management’s incentives would diverge from those of foreign
shareholders, exacerbating the perennial problem of agency
costs between shareholders and management. By contrast,
foreign managers may be more aligned to shareholder
incentives, given the lower likelihood of these non-pecuniary
benefits.137 Taken in sum, provisions restricting nationalitybased discrimination can strengthen investor confidence by
improving enterprise performance and reducing agency costs.
2.

Nationality Restrictions on Board Members

By contrast, the TPP and other agreements frequently do
permit some nationality restrictions on board members:
[A] Party may require that a majority of the board of directors, or
any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that Party that is a
covered investment, be of a particular nationality or resident in the
territory of the Party, provided that the requirement does not

Russian Experience, 11 ECON. OF TRANSITIONAL AND INSTIT. CHANGE 383
(hypothesizing that Russian “foreign-owned firms can benefit from managerial
experience and the distribution network of their foreign owners.”).
136 See Anders Edström & Jay R. Galbraith, Transfer of Managers as a
Coordination and Control Strategy in Multinational Organizations, 22 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 248 (discussing the use of foreign managers as a means of effective
decentralized control).
137
See, e.g., Masayasu Ito & Takashi Sugimoto, Carlos Ghosn: The
Expensive Cost Cutter, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (Nov. 20, 2018, 5:56 JST),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Nissan-s-Ghosn-crisis/Carlos-Ghosn-Theexpensive-cost-cutter (comparing Carlos Ghosn’s implementation of costcutting and workforce reduction in Nissan to the apparent conservatism of
Japanese managers).
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materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over
its investment.138

Such restrictions may be justified on the basis of legal
enforceability and stakeholder-leaning corporate governance.
The enforceability of legal judgements is particularly difficult
against foreign board members. Foreign board members may
avoid liability by fleeing a jurisdiction, and likely have few incountry assets. By contrast, domestic courts may more easily
enforce judgments on locally-based board members, who are
more likely to have in-country interests and assets. Nationality
requirements prevent corporate directors from skirting the
reach of domestic law.
In addition, nationality requirements promote stakeholder
consideration and reduce shareholder dominance. Domestic
directors tied to the domestic context may serve as a check on
the profit-making motives of a company, similar to the dynamic
noted above with domestic executives. Boards with heavy
domestic representation may be less likely to engage in
corporate activities damaging to corporate stakeholders, such as
layoffs. Nationality restrictions could even mitigate national
security risks.
For instance, the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States requires boards to nominate
highly trusted individuals, including former intelligence and
military officials.139 Nationality restrictions can serve as a lowtouch mechanism to achieve the same protective effect,
assuming domestic directors also view their roles as protecting
their home nations’ security interests.
Despite these justifications for nationality restrictions, the
provisions may come at the cost of a level playing field in
managerial labor markets, and even firm performance.
Miletkov et al. have found a positive association between foreign
directors and firm performance under certain conditions; in
particular, the association “is more positive in countries with
TPP, supra note 134, art. 11(2).
See generally Andrew Verstein, The Corporate Governance of National
Security, 95 WASH. U. L. R. 775, 775 (2018) (detailing CFIUS practices
impacting the corporate governance of companies involved in sensitive
national security matters).
138
139
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lower quality legal institutions, and when the director comes
from a country with higher quality legal institutions than the
firm’s host country.”140 Restrictions on the share of foreign
directors may undercut this potential mechanism for improved
firm performance.
In contrast to the TPP and other agreements, the European
Union—Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA) does not allow any nationality restriction for
boards: “[a] Party shall not require that an enterprise of that
Party, that is also a covered investment, appoint to senior
management or board of director positions, natural persons of
any particular nationality.”141 Both parties have strong legal
systems, highly-integrated economies, and an explicit project of
cross-border integration. As a result, the agreement prioritizes
the free flow of highly skilled labor and a vibrant cross-border
market for oversight and management.
Each individual
jurisdiction has much lower concerns about the enforceability of
judgments and the need to maintain locally-tied directors or
officers. The European Union—Canada agreement presents a
counterexample to the TPP, which involves countries of different
economic weights, legal systems, and sensitivity to foreign
ownership.142 Countries of similar levels of openness to trade,
economic development, and the rule of law may more readily
embrace nationality nondiscrimination for boards.
B. State-Owned Enterprises: Equality of Market Participants,
Disclosure, and Conflicted Transactions
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and governmentauthorized monopolies play leading economic roles in countries
with underdeveloped private markets.
International
agreements have increasingly tackled SOEs due to their
government-provided benefits, including preferential treatment
in taxes, regulations, direct or indirect transfers, and
140 Mihail Miletkov et al., Foreign Independent Directors and the Quality
of Legal Institutions, 48 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 1, 1 (2016).
141 See European Union—Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement (CETA), Oct. 30, 2016, art. 8.8, available at https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22017A0114(01)
[hereinafter CETA].
142 TPP, supra note 134.
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government purchasing. These benefits tend to disadvantage
foreign companies and foreign investors, as domestic SOEs
obtain preferential market access and an unfair cost advantage.
Provisions tackling the governance of state-owned enterprises
impact broader corporate governance issues, including the
equality of market participants, disclosure standards, and
conflicted transactions.
In recent years, the OECD has produced an influential set
of guidelines focused on this subfield of corporate governance—
the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned
Enterprises.143 This document complements the G20/OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance with a more specific effort to
address the challenges of government ownership. On the one
hand, these efforts are a domestic matter—countries benefit
from SOEs that operate “efficiently, transparently and in an
accountable manner.”144 Many essential public services, such as
utilities, are provided by SOEs and monopolies.145 On the other
hand, SOE governance is also a challenge on the global stage, as
these enterprises operate and invest outside the domestic
context. The OECD explains the importance of SOE corporate
governance outside home markets: “[a] number of countries are
paying increasing attention to the foreign SOEs that operate in
their jurisdictions—including in the context of trade and
investment agreements—with a view to gauging their
commercial orientations and likely impacts on the competitive
landscape.”146 The presence of government-owned “golden
shares,” and along with other formal and informal mechanisms
for government influence, may create significant discrepancies
between the behavior of SOEs and privately-held corporations
engaged in cross-border trade and investments.147 The rise of
the Chinese economy raises particular issues: Beijing has
created numerous state-controlled “national champions” that
provide a seemingly successful alternative to liberal economies’

OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES 3 (2015) [hereinafter OECD Corporate Guidelines].
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 52.
143
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preference for private ownership.148
Recent trade and investment agreements, such as the TPP,
have reflected concerns about the distortionary impact of
government ownership. The solutions to these concerns about
SOEs touch on the basic principles of corporate governance.
1.

Equality between Foreign and Domestic Actors

Provisions covering SOEs can promote equality in
treatment between foreign and domestic entities. Governments
may use procurement or other commercial transactions in SOEs
to favor domestic entities at the expense of foreign companies
and investors. Article 17.4 of the TPP, dealing with “Nondiscriminatory Treatment and Commercial Considerations,”
requires parties to “act[] in accordance with commercial
considerations in its purchase or sale of a good or service, except
to fulfil any terms of its public service mandate.”149 Foreign
enterprises must receive “treatment no less favourable than . . .
[treatment received] by enterprises of the Party, of any other
Party or of any non-Party.”150 In effect, these provisions create
a minimum floor of treatment that applies to both domestic or
foreign entities. The emphasis on commercial considerations
and national non-discrimination work against the protectionism
built into many SOEs’ business models.
2.

Disclosure and Transparency

International agreements covering SOEs emphasize
disclosure and transparency provisions as a tool for fairer
market access and oversight. The disclosure regime typically
requires party nations to provide information explaining SOEs’
governance structure and financial information—pushing SOEs
towards similar disclosure requirements as for publicly-held
companies. For instance, Article 17.10 of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership requires parties to identify state-owned enterprises
on an official public-facing website.151 Parties may request more
148
149
150
151

Id. at 29.
TPP, supra note 134, art. 17.4.
Id. art. 17.4.
Id. art. 17.10.
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detailed information about the listed entities.152
Such
information includes important powers based on the
government’s position as a shareholder:
[T]he percentage of shares that the Party, its state-owned
enterprises or designated monopolies cumulatively own, and the
percentage of votes that they cumulatively hold, in the entity. . . a
description of any special shares or special voting or other rights
that the Party, its state-owned enterprises or designated
monopolies hold, to the extent these rights are different than the
rights attached to the general common shares of the entity. 153

Transparency requirements also provide insight on the
commercial orientation of the enterprise. Parties are required to
reveal:
[T]he entity’s annual revenue and total assets over the most recent
three year period for which information is available . . . any
exemptions and immunities from which the entity benefits under
the Party’s law; and . . . any additional information regarding the
entity that is publicly available, including annual financial reports
and third-party audits, and that is sought in the written request. 154

Additional provisions also require disclosure of “any policy
or program . . . for non-commercial assistance,” its legal basis,
and policy objectives.155
These requirements not only force disclosure about publiclyowned enterprises, but also establish a broader norm around
transparency. The transparency provisions may exceed the
existing regulations under domestic law.
3.

Mitigating Conflicted Transactions

Trade negotiators are concerned with indirect subsidies
from SOEs giving an unfair advantage to domestic
enterprises.156
Provisions that require SOEs to apply
commercial considerations in transactions attempt to halt this

152
153
154
155
156

Id. art. 17.10(3).
Id. art. 17.10.
Id. art. 17.10.
TPP, supra note 134, art 17.10.
Id. art. 17.6.
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form of market distortion. Surprisingly, these same provisions
can also address the broader governance issues stemming from
improper related-party transactions (RPTs).
Improper RPTs involve an insider or dominant shareholder
engaging in a transaction for the purpose of siphoning wealth. 157
Such behavior, termed “tunneling,” transfers value from the
company to another entity controlled by a dominant shareholder
or a corporate insider.158 In cases where a dominant shareholder
extracts resources, minority shareholders lose the value of their
investment.159 In cases where a corporate insider extracts
resources, shareholders as a class lose the value of their
investment.160 Such transfers of wealth can be used to support
other companies owned by the controlling shareholder—a
phenomenon termed “propping.”161 In related corporate groups,
some companies may suffer from tunneling, while
simultaneously, other companies in the corporate group may
benefit from propping.162
These trends are present and problematic for SOEs. RPTs
between a government and its controlled company provide
opportunities for siphoning wealth from minority private
shareholders by mispricing assets. For instance, a controlled oil
company may purchase government-held exploration rights at
an inflated value, or the government may underpay for
electricity produced by a controlled utility.163 These transactions
hurt private shareholders in the enterprises and benefit the
Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. ASS’N. 22, 22 (2000).
Id.
159 Id. at 24.
160 Id. at 22.
161 Eric Friedman et al., Propping and Tunneling, 31 J. COMP. ECONS.
732, 733 (2003).
162 Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, RPTs in SOEs: Tunneling,
Propping, and Policy Channeling 1, 3–4 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 386, 2018).
163
Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2941–42 (2012) (discussing how the Brazilian
government is suspected to have leveraged its majority control of the oil
company Petrobras to receive excessive payments for the purchase of oil
exploration rights); Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 162, at 3 (discussing
how the government used its control of the electric utility Eletrobras to
renegotiate contracts on terms unacceptable to private actors).
157

158
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government as a controlling shareholder. In cases where SOE
insiders (e.g., managers) engage in improper RPTs, the
transactions may actually hurt all shareholders, including the
government and private investors.
Beyond RPTs, governments can use SOEs to achieve public
policy or political objectives. Such “policy channeling” sacrifices
financial returns for political pay-off, hurting the interests of
private investors.164 As an example, providing cheap fertilizer
from a government company benefits farmers at the expense of
shareholders—but since farmers are not related parties, the
traditional tools of corporate law to cleanse such transactions
would not apply. Under standard corporate law, there is an
assumption that shareholders—and especially controlling
shareholders—will monitor and prevent activities that do not
contribute to profitability. However, the government obtains a
non-pecuniary benefit from these transactions—its upside is
measured in votes during an election, or popular support for an
autocratic regime, and not in financial returns.
International agreements can limit “tunneling” behaviors
by requiring commercial considerations (with narrow public
policy exemptions). These provisions originally emerged to level
the playing field between domestic and foreign actors. The same
provisions also reduce the opportunities for the state or insiders
to expropriate wealth from private shareholders.165 Take, for
example, an SOE with majority government ownership and
private minority investors.
Under provisions requiring
commercial considerations, the government cannot use
uneconomical transactions to unfairly “tunnel” resources from
the partially-privatized SOE to other enterprises. In such a
case, private investors in the SOE benefit from the protections
of the economic agreement.166

Milhaupt & Pargendler, supra note 162, at 5.
Id. at 6 (discussing how fair treatment also works to bring additional
players into constrained domestic markets, as foreign companies and private
domestic companies can gain equal footing).
166 Id. at 3 (discussing how the constraints of commercial considerations
may harm minority investors in the subset of SOEs that had previously
benefited from the government “propping” the SOE).
164
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International agreements tackling SOEs may solve other
existing gaps in corporate law by empowering foreign
enterprises as monitors.
Milhaupt and Pargendler have
outlined that existing corporate law based, on shareholder
oversight may be unable to stop certain “propping” activities:
Corporate law strategies are generally conceived with the interests
of shareholders in mind, who often play a key role in their
enforcement. This means that, even when they work well (which is
often not the case in jurisdictions where SOEs are prevalent), these
strategies may help deter tunneling, which harms shareholders, but
not propping, which benefits shareholders . . . .167

Agreements can similarly fill “propping” activities. Foreign
enterprises, empowered by the agreements, have a vested
interest in identifying and stopping propping activities between
the government and competitor SOEs.
4.

Limitations of Current SOE Provisions

While international agreements present opportunities to
improve corporate governance, some details within the
agreements limit the functionality of the provisions.
For instance, in some cases, the very definition of the SOE
limits the usefulness of the previously discussed provisions. The
TPP defines SOEs as:
[E]nterprises . . . engaged in commercial activities in which a
Party . . . directly owns more than 50 per cent of the share
capital . . . controls, through ownership interests, the exercise of
more than 50 per cent of the voting rights; or . . . holds the power to
appoint a majority of members of the board of directors or any other
equivalent management body.168

The definition leaves out many instances in which the
government can exercise decisive control as a minority
shareholder. In such contexts, the government may form an
implicit or explicit agreement with other dominant shareholders
to defer to government preferences. The government clearly has
the upper hand, with vast powers to change tax and regulatory
167
168

Id. at 9.
TPP, supra note 134, art. 17.1.
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preferences. In addition, politicians often have links to broader
stakeholders that may pressure a corporation—such as
employee unions. In cases where dispersed shareholders hold
the remaining control rights, the state, even with a minority
stake, could exert effective control.
Treaties should incorporate a more flexible standard for
government control. The EU-Vietnam Agreement defines SOEs
to include instances where a party “can exercise control over the
strategic decisions of the enterprise.”169 This definition allows
for an enterprise-specific analysis of government control, rather
than using a binary analysis of whether the state is a majority
owner.170
Another weakness emerges from the multitude of
exemptions providing safe harbors for many SOEs.171 The public
interest and public service exemption in the TPP permits
commercial activities on a non-commercial basis.172 Especially
problematic is the exclusion of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).
SWFs serve broad roles in the allocation of capital and exercise
of governance rights in domestic and foreign corporations. The
1MBD scandal, involving the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund,
underlined that SWFs can suffer from similar tunneling issues
as more traditional SOEs.173 Finally, nations may carve out
specific provisions applicable only to their own enterprises. In
the TPP, such policies may focus on favoring particular ethnic
groups—Malaysia protects its Bumiputera affirmative action
program for ethnic Malays, while Australia protected
preferences for indigenous people.174 Similarly, entire sectors
169
European Union-Vietnam Trade and Investment Protection
Agreement, Sept. 24, 2018, art. 11.1 [hereinafter EVIPA].
170 Id.
171 Id. at 11.
172 See generally Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
U.S. EMBASSY IN URUGUAY (Oct. 6, 2015), https://uy.usembassy.gov/summarytrans-pacific-partnership-agreement/ (discussing the summary of the TransPacific Partnership Agreement).
173 Shamim Adam et al., The Story of Malaysia’s 1MDB, the Scandal That
Shook the World of Finance, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018, 3:05 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/how-malaysia-s-1mdbscandal-shook-the-financial-world-quicktake.
174
Chin Y. Whah & Benny Teh Cheng Guan, Malaysia’s Protracted
Affirmative Action Policy and the Evolution of the Bumiputera Commercial and
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may be excluded, including electricity for Mexico and Vietnam,
oil and gas for Malaysia, and certain financial services for the
United States.175
As a final note, while much of this discussion has focused on
the implicit corporate governance regulation of SOEs in
agreements, the recent EU-Vietnam agreement has actually
explicitly brought the issue to the fore. The agreement discusses
corporate governance under the broader discussion of the
“Regulatory Framework”: “[t]he Parties shall endeavour to
ensure that state-owned enterprises, enterprises granted special
rights or privileges, and designated monopolies observe
internationally
recognized
standards
of
corporate
governance.”176 The EU-Vietnam agreement is relatively soft—
the parties merely “shall endeavor”—but, it provides an explicit
instance of corporate governance situated in the context of SOE
regulation.177
C. Equality of Shareholders in the Same Class
The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance establish
that corporate governance should promote “equal treatment for
foreign and domestic shareholders,” and that, “all shareholders
of the same series of a class should be treated equally.”178 In a
departure from the other instances noted above, international
agreements often infringe on these principles by providing
additional protections to foreign investors, above and beyond the
protections offered to their domestic counterparts.179 These
unequal rights artificially skew corporate decision-making and
capital markets. These protections represent a tension with
other agreements that have promoted and signaled greater
commitment to corporate governance tenets.

Industrial Community, 32 J. SOC. ISSUES IN SE. ASIA 336, 336 (2017).
175 See generally David A. Gantz, The U.S.- Mexico Trade Relationship
Under AMLO: Challenges and Opportunities, RICE U. BAKER INST. PUB. POL’Y,
Apr. 2019 (discussing the affects of the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship under
AMLO).
176 EVIPA, supra note 169.
177 Id. at 8.
178 OECD Principles, supra note 7, at 19.
179 Id.
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This quandary emerges from foreign investors’
disadvantage: they have relatively less influence via established
political mechanisms to protect their investment, especially
from government expropriation. In addition, some countries’
weaker institutional settings raise the risks of all investment—
foreign and domestic—as property rights and contract
enforcement are less secure. Investment protections in treaties
minimize these risks and reduce the cost of capital for inbound
investment.
Protections
promoting
the
equal
treatment
of
shareholders—whether domestic or foreign—can promote
investment. First, the transferability of shares increases, as the
value of shares does not vary based on the nationality of the
shareholder. If one set of investors has fewer legal rights than
another, the weaker investor class will discount the value of the
investment to account for the increased risk. A discrepancy
between the market price for investment and an individual
shareholder’s valuation, adjusted for legal risk, undercuts
capital market liquidity.
Equal treatment ensures that
individual investors do not discount the market value of an
investment based on discriminatory legal treatment.
Second, the battle for corporate control may become more
dynamic, as foreign investors would face fewer barriers to
buying or selling stakes on the basis of nationality. Transfers of
corporate control, or the threat of such transfers, constitute a
mechanism of market-driven discipline.
Boards and
management are aware that a new shareholder may purchase a
controlling stake and impose new board and management
members. Equal treatment of foreign shareholders strengthens
this mechanism for improved firm performance by creating a
more active market for corporate control. Problematically,
protections for foreign shareholders often exceed parity, and
instead, place domestic shareholders at a distinct disadvantage.
The first of the three categories regulating the treatment of
foreign investors, national treatment provisions, support
equality. Parties are forbidden from discriminating in favor of
domestic investors. The typical language, here excerpted from
the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, compels that:
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Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments in its territory.180

Next, agreements also include a most-favored nation (MFN)
provision, which sets a minimum floor for treatment based on
the treatment provided to non-parties. A typical provision,
again excerpted from the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
requires that:
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no
less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.181

Scholars have referred to such provisions as reasonable and
“modest,” due to the limitation to “like circumstances.”182 In
cases where the provision does apply, foreign shareholders
would benefit from improved treatment based on the text of
other agreements. Meanwhile, domestic shareholders remain
subject to potentially sub-standard domestic law.
Such
discrepancy violates the equality promoted by corporate
governance principles.
Finally, agreements include broader language to establish
fair dealing standards. The typical standard of treatment, here
from the TPP draft, obligates that, “[e]ach Party shall accord to
covered investments treatment in accordance with customary
international law, including fair and equitable treatment and
full protection and security.”183 Dozer explains that “the purpose
of the clause as used in [bilateral investment treaty] practice is
to fill gaps which may be left by the more specific standards, in
180 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, May 15, 2012,
art. 10.3.1 [hereinafter Trade Promotion Agreement].
181 Id. art. 10.4.1.
182
Don Wallace & David B. Bailey, The Inevitability of National
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment with Increasingly Few and Narrow
Exceptions, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 615, 620 (1998).
183 Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 180, art. 10.5.1.
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order to obtain the level of investor protection intended by the
treaties.”184 This standard can be based on multiple reference
points, including the law of the host nation at the time of
investment, or principles of due process.185 This provision,
though appearing on its face as encouraging equality, may
actually require disparate treatment: if existing domestic
practice falls below “customary international law,” foreign
shareholders could benefit from improved treatment while
domestic shareholders would remain subject to sub-standard
domestic law.186 Again, foreign investors benefit from rights
unavailable to domestic investors of the same or similarlysituated enterprises.
As a whole, the provisions already in effect underline the
emergence of corporate governance regulation in international
agreements. While the EU-Japan EPA represents the first
instance of a dedicated chapter on the subject, past agreements
have tackled the field despite its perception as an arena for
domestic law.

CONCLUSION
The study of corporate governance has thus far largely
ignored an emerging source of regulation: international
economic agreements. State-to-state agreements implicitly and
explicitly tackle issues related to corporate governance—where
provisions alter the web of relationships governing the actors
within a firm.
The signing of the EU-Japan Economic
Partnership Agreement has brought this trend to the fore. For
the first time, negotiations have produced a dedicated corporate
governance chapter. This development requires greater study,
as the European Union or the United States may push corporate
governance initiatives in other agreements. Such initiatives
would enable domestic reformers to push for new legal
frameworks that encourage accountability.

Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in
Investment Treaties, 39 INT’L LAWYER 87, 90 (2005).
185 See id. at 93, 97 (discussing the 2004 U.S.- Model BIT and its fair and
equitable treatment).
186 Sykes, supra note 103, at 511.
184
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Future comparative work should consider how these
agreements fit into the evolution of corporate law. These
developments complicate a view that comparative corporate law
should focus only on domestic legal developments. Instead,
corporate governance via international agreements may support
greater convergence across jurisdictions. Such changes signal
progress, as long as individual states can maintain the power to
shape domestic codes to address unique local concerns.
Ultimately, future agreements may follow the positive lead of
the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: effective
signaling mechanisms, rather than fully binding commitments
to specific rules.
In recent years, new topics, such as labor and environmental
chapters, have become essential components in international
economic agreements. These disciplines acknowledge the vast
impact of economic agreements on different stakeholders within
party nations. A similar transformation could occur on the
corporate governance front. Recent accords, such as the TPP
and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, may be on
the vanguard of international agreements influencing domestic
corporate governance and the firm’s constituents.
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